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METHOD IN CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY:
FURTHER REFLECTIONS
James A. Keller
I am pleased to learn that Professor Plantinga thinks we are in substantive
agreement; I now think so too. Nevertheless I still detect a difference in emphasis
that may have been the occasion for what I earlier took to be perhaps a difference
in principle. In his reply (though not in the original paper) Plantinga does state
explicitly that some secular beliefs do outweigh some Christian beliefs and that
if they conflict, the Christian belief might require reinterpretation or modification,
and he gives a few examples of possible conflicts. But neither in his original
paper nor in his reply did he discuss any actual cases. Thus, I was tempted to
take his apparent concessions in the original as somewhat pro forma-and I
wrongly yielded to the temptation.
These features of Plantinga's papers do, however, suggest at least a difference
in emphasis between him and me. I commended secular beliefs as a help in
defining, clarifying, and challenging one's present understanding of his Christian
faith. Plantinga does not mention this use (though he also does not deny it). Yet
in his own work he celtainly does so use secular beliefs--e.g., a possible worlds
ontology to clarify the nature of God's existence, goodness, etc. So why did he
not mention this use in his original paper? Perhaps because he thought it unnecessary for his intended audience, as he suggests in the last paragraph of his reply.
But I had a somewhat different group of possible readers in mind: one which
included people who might use secular beliefs only to the extent that they
confirmed all (or some of) their Christian beliefs or who were not aware that
what they now took to be Christian beliefs long ago were secular beliefs or who
had incorporated secular beliefs into their Christian beliefs without recognizing
or acknowledging that they had baptized something secular. Perhaps no Christian
philosopher of today would fall into any of these groups, but in case any might,
I thought it salutary to bring out in some detail the contributions which secular
beliefs had made and still might make to articulating and challenging our understanding of the Christian faith.
I do agree with Plantinga that one task of Christian philosophers is to engage
in philosophical reflection on specifically Christian doctrines-Trinity, Incarnation, atonement, etc. But as we do this, to what extent should we attempt to
take into account not just philosophical difficulties in articulating them in a form
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free of philosophical problems, but also historical and biblical studies into the
origin of these doctrines and the pattern and causes of their growth within the
Christian community? Historical and biblical studies are not within the usual
province of philosophers, but these studies often raise serious questions about
whether traditional doctrines are the best way, to say nothing of the only way,
to formulate beliefs involved in Christian faith. For what we take as traditional
Christian doctrines have been developed by Christian thinkers in light of particular
philosophies (and in light of certain understandings of biblical and historical
matters). Are we as Christians obligated to defend those philosophies or to defend
formulations which incorporate aspects of these philosophies? I see no reason
to think so. And in the light of historical and biblical studies there often seems
little basis for giving much initial weight to traditional formulations. (I suspect
that another difference between Plantinga and me might be in the degree of
confidence we place in traditional doctrinal formulations.) A concern about such
matters influenced me to include a discussion of the role of principles underlying
historical and biblical studies and to stress our responsibility as Christians to
criticize our current understanding of the Christian faith.
Plantinga also discusses two points "where perhaps we do disagree." On the
second, I will agree with him that some hermeneutical principles might conflict
(or might require interpretations of texts in ways that conflict) with certain
Christian beliefs and that in such cases the Christian is not obligated to accept
the principle simply because her non-Christian colleagues do so. I would only
caution that she should be willing to examine critically the hermeneutical principles that underlie her own understanding of the Christian faith. I do think that
no one should adopt hermeneutical principles or use them in such a way as to
make it impossible to discover or admit that they are inadequate.
I fear, however, that I cannot agree with Planting a about Aquinas and the
Thomistic tradition. My claim was that according to this tradition "to whatever
extent we understand what we say about God, we do so by analogy with what
we say about creatures" (italics added). I made this claim in the context of
criticizing Plantinga for using his understanding of the personhood of God to
draw conclusions about what a human person is. Plantinga responded that
according to Aquinas much of what we understand about God, we learn by
revelation" (italics his). Aquinas did indeed hold that much of what we know
(or properly believe) about God we do on the basis of revelation. But my point
was concerned with how we understand what we say we know or believe on the
basis of revelation. And on this point I take it that Thomas said that the terms
we apply to God we understand on the basis of analogy with their creaturely
meaning. In particular, if we should say on the basis of revelation that God is
a person (or that God is an agent or that God does things), our understanding
of God as a person (or an agent or doing things) is arrived at by analogizing
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from the creaturely meaning of these terms. No doubt the content of the analogical
meaning is in part determined by other things we believe about God (perhaps
on the basis of revelation), but that means it is controlled by our understanding
of what we say we believe about God, and there more analogical understanding
is involved. Thus, I continue to think that according to the Thomistic tradition
we cannot use our understanding of "person" applied to God to illuminate our
understanding of "person" applied to humans.
Wofford College

